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MEMORANDUM FOR: 25X1A5a2 [REDACTED] ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
PLANS AND POLICY, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: Task Group I Inventory Report

1. a. Task Group I of Panel "B" has prepared a list of activities and programs, both governmental and private instrumentalities, which by their nature could be classified as "in being" or potential cold war weapons. The listing of weapons has been related to specific fields of endeavor; viz.:

Agriculture	Labor
Communications	Political Action Groups
Culture	Professions
Economics	Military
Education	Science
Entertainment	Religion
Government	Miscellaneous Techniques and Weapons

b. Where applicable within these fields, a complementary listing of covert activities and programs was also prepared.

c. Within the broad political, economic, military, and propaganda classifications, a supplementary listing of techniques was prepared for verification purposes.

d. Within each field of endeavor the following details were included: A list of means, the primary department responsible or with respect to the covert aspects the agency of coordination, the action effect or capabilities desired, and a brief statement of relative effectiveness and feasibility of means. A list of policy planning offices was not included. A card index system of such contacts has been prepared in the Office of Coordination, PSB.

2. It would now appear appropriate for other agencies to review or contribute to the overt lists; the State Department on economics, government, communications; the Department of Defense on military; the Department of Labor on labor; a panel of educators on education; a review by specialists on science, religion, professions.

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3. It will be

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3. It will be observed that an inventory of weapons, while it contains a modicum of basic information, does not, in fact, assess the weapons available in the cold war in terms of their real value; i.e., in impressing our will upon the enemy. The circumstances of use — the integration of the weapons into a scheme of action — will actually determine the role weapons can play in the advancement of national cold war strategy. It appears advisable, therefore, that the U. S. cold war potential be measured in terms of plans and not, alone, in terms of weapons; in feasible ideas as well as material forces.

It is suggested, as the next step, that the Psychological Strategy Board inventory cold war plans in being and suggested plans in drawing board draft. Only in the implementation of plans can there be any true measure of the value of a weapon.

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